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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Brent Arden Reece appeals from the district court's order summarily 
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In July 2010, Jerome police officer Edward Gates received a call from 
dispatch about a reckless driver. (R., p.47.) The reporting party observed the 
driver run a stop sign, fishtail, and then nearly collide with her vehicle. (R., p.42.) 
After the reporting party informed police, she followed the driver and observed 
him to be Brent Reece, an individual she was familiar with. (R., pp.42-43.) The 
reporting party then returned home to her apartment complex, where she awaited 
police. (R., p.43.) Before police arrived, Reece pulled into the same apartment 
complex parking lot and entered an apartment there. (Id.) 
Officer Gates arrived at the scene, spoke with the reporting party, and 
then knocked on the door of the apartment Reece had entered. (R., pp.47-48.) 
Reece stepped outside and admitted he had been drinking that evening and that 
he had just driven home. (R., p.48.) Officer Gates then initiated field sobriety 
tests. (Id.) Reece failed some of the field sobriety tests, and refused or failed to 
complete others. (R., pp.48-53.) Officer Gates also observed that Reece was 
slurring his speech, and was having trouble following directions and keeping his 
balance. (R., p.50.) Officer Gates arrested Reece on suspicion of driving under 
the influence and transported him to the jail. (R., pp.53-54.) 
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Upon arrival at the jail, Reece refused to submit to a breathalyzer test. 
(R., p.55.) Officer Gates and several jail deputies transported Reece to a 
hospital, where he was subjected to a forced blood, which Reece verbally and 
physically resisted. (Id.) The blood was sent to the Idaho State Lab in Pocatello, 
where testing performed by forensic scientist Lamora Lewis revealed a .110 
blood alcohol content. (R., pp.55-57, 74-80, 102-103.) 
The state charged Reece (who had a prior felony DUI conviction within the 
previous 10 years), with felony driving under the influence and the persistent 
violator sentencing enhancement. See State v. Reece, 2012 Unpublished 
Opinion No. 644, Docket No. 38661 (Idaho App., September 24, 2012). After a 
trial, the jury found Reece guilty of the charge and the enhancement. (kl; R., 
pp.39-99.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of 25 years with seven 
years fixed. Reece, 2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 644. On direct appeal, 
Reece asserted that the sentence was excessive, but the Idaho Court of Appeals 
affirmed the district court. Id. 
In 2011, the Idaho State Police conducted an administrative investigation 
of several employees of the Idaho State Police Forensic Services. (R., pp.14-
32.) The ensuing report, disclosed in February 2012, stated that state forensic 
scientist Lewis and others maintained an ongoing unauthorized quantity of 
controlled narcotics for display purposes, outside the practices of the Forensics 
Quality Manual and without proper documentation tracking and auditing, as far 
back as 2003. (Id.) The display drugs were used for tours of the facility. (Id.) 
Lewis admitted to being aware of and failing to report the existence of the display 
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narcotics, but denied knowledge of where the narcotics originally came from. 
(R., pp.20-22.) She told investigators that the practice of maintaining the 
narcotics was already in place when she began employment with the Idaho State 
Lab. (Id.) The report concluded that there no evidence any testing was 
misconduct, and no reason to be that the laboratory's 
accreditation would be (R., p.14.) 
Reece then filed a petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.3-13.) Reece 
asserted: (1) the state committed a Brady1 violation by failing to disclose Lewis' 
misconduct; (2) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress 
evidence obtained by a forced blood draw in light of Missouri v. McNeely, _ 
U.S. 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013); and (3) his trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to object to the admission of certain state witness testimony at trial. (Id.) 
The district court entered a notice of intent to summarily dismiss each of 
Reece's claims. (R., pp.159-178.) Reece filed a response to the district court's 
notice. (R., pp.179-194.) The district court then dismissed Reece's post-
conviction petition after concluding that Reece failed to assert facts that would, if 
true, entitle him to relief as to any of his claims. (R., pp.200-223.) The district 
court also dismissed Reece's subsequent motion for reconsideration, in which 
Reece asserted that the court failed to give him adequate notice of dismissal as 
to his Brady claim. (R., pp.224-230.) Reece timely appealed. (R., p.231.) 
1 Brady v. Maryland, 837 U.S. 83 (1963). 
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ISSUES 
states on appeal as: 
1. err when it summarily dismissed Reece's 
by finding that the District Court would not have 
the impeachment evidence during the underlying 
criminal trial and that the lack of the impeachment evidence 
during the underlying criminal trial did prejudice Reece? 
2. Did the trial court err when it summarily dismissed Reece's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim by holding that the 
legal analysis of State v. Diaz was grounds to summarily 
dismiss the claim? 
3. Did the trial court err when it did not give Reece the 
opportunity to respond to its legal reasoning in its 
Memorandum Decision? 
(Appellant's brief, p.6) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Reece failed to show the district court erred by summarily dismissing 
his Brady claim concerning Pocatello lab misconduct? 
2. Has Reece failed to show the district court erred by summarily dismissing 
his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to 
suppress evidence obtained by a forced blood draw? 
3. Has Reece failed to show that the district court failed to give Reece proper 




Reece Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing 
His Brady Claim Concerning Pocatello Lab Misconduct 
A Introduction 
Reece contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his 
Brady claim concerning misconduct committed by Idaho State Lab forensic 
scientist Lamora Lewis. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-13.) However, a review of the 
record reveals that Reece failed to establish a Brady violation because he failed 
to demonstrate prejudice from any lack of required disclosure. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact 
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any 
affidavits on file .... " Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 
(2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). 
C. Reece Failed To Establish A Brady Violation 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own 
initiative. "To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must 
present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the 
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 
5 
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to 
summary dismissal "if the applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of 
material fact" as to each element of the petitioner's claims. Workman, 144 Idaho 
at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 
90 P.3d at 297. 
Due process requires the prosecution to disclose to the defense all 
exculpatory evidence known to the state or in its possession. Brady v. Maryland, 
837 U.S. 83 (1963). The duty to disclose includes impeachment evidence. 
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). When there has been a 
conviction after trial, a Brady violation is found if the defendant can show: (1) that 
the evidence was exculpatory or impeaching; (2) that the evidence was 
suppressed by the state; and (3) materiality (i.e. prejudice). State v. Shackelford, 
150 Idaho 355, 380, 247 P.3d 582, 607 (2010) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 
U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999)). In a Brady analysis, prejudice is shown if there is a 
reasonable probability that, had the withheld evidence been disclosed to the 
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Kyles v. 
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,434 (1995). A "reasonable probability" of a different result 
is shown when the government's suppression of evidence undermines 
confidence in the outcome of the trial. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682; State v. Gardner, 
126 Idaho 428,436, 885 P.2d 1144, 1152 (2013). 
At Reece's trial, Lamora Lewis testified about the general procedures that 
occur when evidence is submitted to the state lab. (R., pp.77-79.) She also 
testified that she followed these procedures when processing and ultimately 
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testing Reece's blood, as she does with all evidence she receives. (Id.) While 
Reece could arguably show that the subsequently-disclosed evidence of Lewis' 
misconduct constituted evidence that could have been utilized at trial to impeach 
Lewis' testimony that she follows protocol with all evidence, he has failed to show 
that the evidence was so damning that its absence undermines confidence in the 
outcome of the trial. 
In denying Reece's Brady claim, the district court cited the applicable 
standards and correctly concluded that Reece failed to establish prejudice. (R., 
pp.207-210.) The court recognized that the "misconduct that was discovered did 
not concern the mishandling of evidence in any case; did not concern the 
procedures or protocol used in testing blood for alcohol concentration; and does 
not suggest or indicate that the reliability of any test results were compromised in 
any way." (R., pp.208-209.) Indeed, there was no nexus between Lewis' 
misconduct of maintaining an unauthorized quantity of narcotics for display 
purposes and the testing results that actually incriminated Reece at his trial, or 
any other evidence from any other case. 
Additionally, Reece offered no expert testimony at the trial or in the course 
of the post-conviction proceeding to either challenge the results of blood test, or 
to attempt to explain how any lab misconduct may have altered the results; nor 
did Reece seek to have the sample tested himself. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals recently came to a similar conclusion, albeit in 
dicta, in another case involving the Pocatello State Lab misconduct. State v. 
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Schultz, 2 2013 WL 6840174 (Ct. App. 2013). Schultz, who pied guilty to 
possession of methamphetamine, raised a post-conviction Brady claim regarding 
the misconduct of another state lab forensic scientist, who, like Lewis, admitted 
to being aware of and failing to report the existence of the display narcotics at the 
Pocatello lab. kt The Court rejected Schultz's Brady claim because a state has 
no duty to disclose impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement 
with a defendant. kt (citing United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633, (2002)). 
However, the Court also noted that Schultz failed to establish prejudice from any 
lack of disclosure: 
Schultz is also unable to establish prejudice because there is 
no nexus between the misconduct and the testing of the 
methamphetamine. Nothing about the State's new disclosures goes 
to the foundation of Schultz's case or otherwise serves to 
undermine confidence in the outcome of these proceedings. See 
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,717,215 P.3d 414,437 (2009). 
Schultz. 2013 WL 6840174 at *5, n.2. 
Reece has failed to demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability of 
acquittal had the state disclosed evidence of Lewis' lab misconduct prior to trial. 
He has therefore also failed to allege facts from which he was entitled to relief on 
his Brady claim, or shown that the district court erred in summarily dismissing 
that claim. 
2 Reece did not have the benefit of the Court's opinion in Schultz when he wrote 
his Appellant's brief. 
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D. In The Alternative. Reece Also Failed To Show That The Evidence Of 
Lewis' Misconduct Was Admissible Impeachment Evidence 
In its notice of intent to dismiss Reece's Brady claim, the district court 
stated that had the state disclosed Lewis' misconduct prior to trial, it would likely 
not have permitted Reece to use such evidence to impeach Lewis's trial 
testimony. (R., p.176.) In other words, the district court indicated that the 
testimony was not admissable impeachment testimony. While the district court 
did not rely on this ground in ultimately dismissing Reece's petition (R., p.207), it 
is a ground for which Reece had notice, and is thus a potential alternative ground 
upon which this Court may affirm the district court's summary dismissal of the 
claim. 
As noted above, Lewis testified at trial that she followed a particular set of 
required procedures with regard to "every sample that [she] receive[s]." (R., 
p.78.) On appeal, Reece contends that this testimony opened the door for 
impeachment testimony regarding Lewis' misconduct. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-
13.) However, Lewis' misconduct did not concern any evidence that she 
"received" as a part of any criminal investigation or trial proceeding. To the 
contrary, Lewis told investigators that she did not know the origin of the display 
narcotics, and that the practice of maintaining the narcotics was already in place 
when she began employment with the Idaho State Lab. (R., pp.20-22.) Thus, 
evidence of Lewis' misconduct did not speak to her credibility in testing evidence, 
or in following required protocol with regard to evidence actually received. 
Because Reece has failed to establish that evidence of Lewis' misconduct 
would have been admissible impeachment evidence, this Court may affirm the 
9 
district court's summarily dismissal of 
ground. 
11. 
Brady claim on this alternative 
Reece Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing 
His Claim That His Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Move To 
Suppress Evidence Obtained By A Forced Blood Draw 
A. Introduction 
Reece contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his 
claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress 
evidence obtained by a forced blood draw. (Appellant's brief, pp.13-15.) 
However, a review of the record reveals that Reece failed to allege facts that 
would entitle him to an evidentiary hearing on this claim. Specifically, Reece 
failed to make even a prima facie showing that any motion to suppress the blood 
evidence would have been successful. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact 
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any 
affidavits on file .... " Workman, 144 Idaho at 523, 164 P.3d at 803 (citing Gilpin-
Grubb, 138 Idaho at 80, 57 P.3d at 791 ). 
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C. Reece Failed To Raise A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact With Respect To 
His Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claim 
As discussed above, Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal 
of an application for post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on 
the court's own initiative. A claim for post-conviction relief is subject to summary 
dismissal "if the applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact" as 
to each element of the petitioner's claims. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d 
at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. 
A post-conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must 
demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 
137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). An attorney's performance is not constitutionally 
deficient unless it falls below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there 
is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct is within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 
P.2d 283, 286 (1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401,406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 
(Ct. App. 1989). "[S]trategic or tactical decisions will not be second-guessed on 
appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance 
of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." Baldwin 
v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153-54, 177 P.3d 362, 367-68 (2008). 
In a post-conviction proceeding challenging an attorney's failure to pursue 
a motion in the underlying criminal action, the district court may consider the 
probability of success of the motion in question in determining whether the 
attorney's inactivity constituted incompetent performance. Boman v. State, 129 
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Idaho 520, 526, 927 P.2d 910, 916 (Ct. App. 1996). \/\/here the alleged deficiency 
is counsel's failure to file a motion, a conclusion that the motion, if pursued, 
would not have been granted by the trial court is generally determinative of both 
prongs of the Strickland test. 1st 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. "A 
warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within certain 
special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v. 
Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 873, 11 P.3d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971 ); see also State v. Ferreira, 133 
Idaho 474, 479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999)). Consent is such an 
exception to the warrant requirement, and may be implied under Idaho's implied 
consent statute. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302-03, 160 P.3d 739, 741-42 
(2007). A separate exception, exigency, has also been recognized in the context 
of DUI investigation blood draws. 1st 
In this case, Reece asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to move for the suppression of the blood evidence in light of the recent United 
States Supreme Court opinion of Missouri v. McNeely, _ U.S. _, 133 S.Ct. 
1552 (2013) (R., pp.7-9.) In McNeely, the United State Supreme Court held that 
a driving under the influence investigation did not create a per se exigency 
warrant exception. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552. However, as the district court 
recognized, McNeely only addressed the exigency exception to the warrant 
requirement, and that the officers' drawing of Reece's blood was justified 
separately by Idaho's implied consent statute. (R., pp.210-212.) 
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Indeed, this Court has clearly stated that consent and exigent 
circumstances are different exceptions to the warrant requirement Diaz, 144 
Idaho at 302, 160 P.3d at 7 41 ("Exigency, however, is not the lone applicable 
exception here; consent is also a well-recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement"); see also State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 712-13, 184 P.3d 215, 
218-19 (Ct. App. 2008) ("Even if the exigent circumstances exception was 
inapplicable, the blood draw was valid pursuant to DeWitt's implied consent."). 
The Supreme Court of the United States also recognized this distinction in 
McNeely. In that case, the only question before the Court was "whether the 
natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream presents a per se exigency 
that justifies an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement for 
nonconsensual blood testing in all drunk-driving cases." McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 
1556. The Court held that "exigency in this context must be determined case by 
case based on the totality of the circumstances." kl Thus, the issue was limited 
to "nonconsensua/ blood testing" (emphasis added) and the holding was limited 
to the exigent circumstances exception. Thus, blood draws justified by implied 
13 
consent, such as at issue in this case, were not within the scope of either the 
issue or the holding in McNeely. 3 
On appeal, Reece also attempts to distinguish Diaz on the ground that 
Diaz did not physically and verbally resist the blood draw, as Reece did. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.13-14.) Reece however, has offered no binding legal 
authority supporting the significance of this distinction. To the contrary, the Idaho 
Court of Appeals has indicated that Idaho's implied consent statute permits 
officers to "forcibly" draw blood where they have reasonable grounds to believe a 
person was driving under the influence. State v. LeClercq, 149 Idaho 905, 243 
P.3d 1093 (Ct. App. 2010). In LeClereq, the Court upheld a conviction where an 
officer advised a DUI suspect that if she did not submit to a breath test, he would 
take her to the hospital for a "forced" blood draw. kL The Court recognized that 
an officer's threat is not is not coercive if the threat "merely informs the suspect of 
the officer's intention to do something that is within the officer's authority based 
on the circumstances." kt at 911, 243 P.3d at 1099 (quoting State v. Garcia, 143 
Idaho 774, 779, 152 P.3d. 645, 650 (Ct. App. 2006)). 
Further, even if the holding of McNeely would have somehow rendered the 
blood evidence inadmissible in this case, Reece's trial counsel could not rely on it 
3 Additionally, Reece has failed to show that the warrantless blood draw was not 
also justified by the exigency exception. In McNeely, while the United States 
Supreme Court held there was no per se exigency exception to the warrant 
requirement for blood draws in DUI investigations, it also indicated that such 
exigency could still be found on a case-by-case basis. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 
1556-1568. In the present case, Reece was not contacted by officers until 
sometime after the reporting party observed him driving. (See R., pp.40-99.) 
This created a greater exigency for collection of evidence than exists in a typical 
DUI investigation, in which an officer observes the suspect driving immediately 
prior to the commencement of the investigation. 
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in determining whether to file a motion to suppress because it was published two 
years after Reece's trial. There is no general duty on behalf of counsel to 
anticipate changes in the law. Piro v. State, 146 Idaho 86, 91-92, 190 P.3d 905, 
910-911 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Green v. Johnson, 116 F.3d 1115, 1125 (5th Cir. 
1997)); see also Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that 
counsel cannot be required to anticipate later decisions.) At the time of Reece's 
2010 trial, the Idaho Court of Appeals recognized that, "[i]t [was] well established 
that blood draws to test for alcohol concentration [were] within this exigency 
exception because blood alcohol content diminishes over time, and valuable 
evidence would be lost in the time required to obtain a warrant." DeWitt, 145 
Idaho 709, 184 P.3d 215 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 
(1966); State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 370, 775 P.2d 1210, 1212 (1989); State 
v. Worthington, 138 Idaho 470, 65 P.3d 211 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Cooper, 136 
Idaho 697, 700-701, 39 P.3d 637, 640-641 (Ct. App. 2001 )). Any attempt by 
Reece's counsel to pursue a motion using the theory that later became the 
holding of McNeely would likely have been unsuccessful in 2010.4 
Reece has failed to show that any attempt by his trial counsel to suppress 
blood evidence from his trial would have been successful. He has therefore 
failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file such a 
4 Reece's trial counsel also did not have the benefit of State v. Butler, 302 P.3d 
609, 613 (Ariz. 2013), another case on which Reece relies (Appellant's brief, 
pp.14-15), in which the Arizona Supreme Court held that "independent of 
[Arizona's implied consent statute], the Fourth Amendment requires an arrestee's 
consent to be voluntary to justify a warrantless blood draw." 
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motion, and has failed to show that the district court erred in summarily 
dismissing this claim. 
111. 
Reece Has Failed To Show That The District Court Failed To Give Reece Proper 
Notice Before Summarily Dismissing His Brady Claim 
A. Introduction 
Reece contends that the district court failed to provide him adequate 
notice before summarily dismissing his Brady claim. (Appellant's brief, pp.15-
16.) However, the district court's notice of intent to dismiss was sufficient to put 
Reece on notice that it intended to dismiss his Brady claim on the ground that 
Reece failed to assert facts that if true, would satisfy the required prongs of a 
Brady analysis, including prejudice. 
B. The District Court Provided Adequate Notice Before Dismissing Reece's 
Brady Claim 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 provides for the summary disposition of an 
application for post-conviction relief upon motion by a party or on the court's own 
initiative. Follinus v. State, 127 Idaho 897, 899, 908 P.2d 590, 592 (Ct. App. 
1995). "When the court considering the petition for post-conviction relief is 
contemplating dismissal sua sponte, it must notify the parties of its intention to 
dismiss and must provide its reasons for the potential dismissal." Banks v. State, 
123 Idaho 953, 954, 855 P.2d 38, 39 (1993) (citations omitted); see also I.C. § 
19-4906(b). The purpose of the notice requirement of I.C. § 19-4906(b) is to give 
the petitioner the opportunity to provide further legal authority or evidence to 
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establish a genuine issue of material fact. Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417, 418, 
825 P.2d 1073, 1074 (1991); State v. Christensen, 102 Idaho 487,489, 632 P.2d 
676, 678 (1981); Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 818, 892 P.2d 488, 493 (Ct. 
App. 1995). 
Notice is not sufficient if it merely reiterates the language of the UPCPA 
and contends the post-conviction petitioner is not entitled to relief. Banks, 123 
Idaho at 954, 855 P.2d at 39. Rather, the notice must "identify with ... 
particularity why the district court deemed [petitioner's] evidence or legal theories 
to be deficient." Downing v. State, 132 Idaho 861,864,979 P.2d 1219, 1222 (Ct. 
App. 1999). The notice must give the UPCPA petitioner a meaningful opportunity 
to provide further legal authority or evidence that may demonstrate the existence 
of a genuine factual issue. Martinez, 126 Idaho at 818, 892 P.2d at 493. 
In this case, the district court entered a notice of intent to sua sponte 
dismiss Reece's petition for post-conviction relief and all of the claims contained 
within, including his Brady claim concerning the misconduct of state forensic 
scientist Lamora Lewis. (R, pp.159-178.) On appeal, Reece narrowly describes 
the court's stated ground for dismissal in its notice as being that evidence of the 
misconduct would not be admissible at trial because it would have "confused the 
issues." (Appellant's brief, pp.15-16.) However, a review of the district court's 
notice of intent reveals a broader basis for the proposed dismissal. The district 
court recited the applicable facts and law, including Brady, and then stated: 
The jury had the opportunity to judge Lewis's credibility, as 
she testified regarding the handling of the Petitioner's blood test 
results. Had the report or any information regarding the lab's 
inadequate practices been available at the time of the trial, this 
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Court would not have likely allowed the Petitioner to impeach Lewis 
because the information would have confused the issues. The 
report does not indicate any mishandling of evidence in cases, 
including the Petitioner's case. Lewis and other staff members' 
failure to abide by internal policy, does not render their handling of 
all evidence invalid. The investigation into the staff members was 
unrelated to Lewis' testimony regarding the Petitioner's test results. 
The Petitioner was given a full and fair opportunity to cross-
examine Lamora Lewis with regard to show she handled evidence 
in this case. 
(R., p.176.) 
First, it is apparent that the district court intended to dismiss Reece's post-
conviction claim because he failed to assert facts that would demonstrate a 
Brady violation, as opposed to some procedural ground. Further, while the 
district court did not expressly recite the three required prongs an individual must 
demonstrate to successfully assert a Brady violation, its stated rationale for 
dismissal touched upon both whether the proposed evidence actually constituted 
impeachment evidence, and whether Reece was prejudiced by the lack of 
disclosure. In the latter respect, the court recognized the limited evidentiary 
value of the proposed evidence. This notice provided Reece the opportunity to 
present additional facts or legal argument on the issue of how the evidence 
would have resulted in an acquittal. 
Reece responded to this notice, and specifically asserted that he had 
satisfied each of the three Brady prongs, including prejudice. (R., pp.181-186.) 
Thus, Reece appeared to understand the district court's notice of dismissal as 
stating that Reece failed to demonstrate a Brady violation as a matter of law, and 
that prejudice was a component of that analysis. 
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The district court then summarily dismissed Reece's Brady claim on the 
grounds that he failed to demonstrate prejudice. (R., pp.206-210.) Much of the 
court's analysis was similar to that contained in its notice of intent to dismiss. 
The court stated: 
The sole issue on this particular claim is whether the failure 
to disclose the misconduct on the part of Ms. Lewis was prejudicial 
to the petitioner. The misconduct that was discovered did not 
concern the mishandling the evidence in any case; did not concern 
the procedures or protocol used in testing blood for alcohol 
concentration; and does not suggest or indicate that the reliability of 
any test results were compromised in any way. 
(R., pp.208-209.) 
The district court's notice of intent to dismiss was thus sufficient to put 
Reece on notice that it intended to summarily dismiss his Brady claim on the 
grounds that he had failed to allege facts that would satisfy the prongs of a Brady 
analysis, including prejudice. This Court should therefore affirm the district 
court's summary dismissal of this claim. 
C. Even If The District Court's Notice Of Intent To Dismiss The Bradv Claim 
Was Inadequate, Any Such Error Was Harmless 
"The [post-conviction] notice procedure is necessary so that the applicant 
is afforded an opportunity to respond and to establish a material issue of fact if 
one exists." Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 865, 243 P.3d 675, 681 (Ct App. 
2010) (citation omitted); see also Bakerv. State, 142 ldaho411, 422-423, 128 
P.3d 948, 958-959 (Ct App. 2005) ("Baker was not left with an 'invisible target' 
and was able to respond in a meaningful way to the district court's notice of intent 
to dismiss."); Franck-Teel v. State, 143 Idaho 664, 671, 152 P.3d 25, 32 (Ct. App. 
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2006) ("Nevertheless, if Franck-Teel's response to the state's motion for 
summary dismissal reveals that she understood the basis for dismissal ... , then 
we will conclude that the inadequacy of notice was harmless error."). 
In this case, despite the asserted lack of adequate notice, Reece in fact 
did respond to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss and argued, among 
other things, that he established prejudice from the lack of disclosure of the lab 
misconduct. (R., p.185.) Reece has not attempted to speculate what different 
facts he would have alleged, or how his response would have otherwise been 
different if the district court more expressly and specifically stated prejudice as a 
potential grounds for dismissal. 
Because Reece had and took the opportunity to argue that he was 
prejudiced by the lack of disclosure of the lab misconduct, any deficiency in the 
district court's notice of intent to dismiss Reece's Brady claim is harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order summarily dismissing Reece's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 18th day of February, 2014 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
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